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ABSTRACT
This paper examines evidence on employment practices in theU.S.
with respect to race and the impact of governmental anti—biasactivity
on these practices. It shows a striking difference in theresponses of
American employers to job applications differing inrace from the responses
of British employers and asks whether these differencescan be attributed
to the greater U.S. effort to aid minority workers. It reviewsthe recent
research by Jonathan Leonard on the effect of court suits andaffirmative
action compliance activity and concludes that much of theimpr,ved status
of minorities in the U.S. is indeed due to governmentalactivity and public
policy.
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An errployer is said to discriminate against rkers of a given
ethnic group when, faced with equally competent applicants for a job
(prcnotion) fran that group and other groups, he selects members of the
given ethnicity in disproportionately low numbers. If relatively many
employers have such discriminatory attitudes members of the group dis-
criininated against will be forced to take lower wages (wDrse jobs) than
their peers or to suffer from ineaploent. Their lower wages/rse
jobs can be viewed as a means of canpensating employers for prejudiced
1/ attitudes in the cxntext of the thary of compensating differentials.
In light of the preceding definition of employer discrimination,
consider the comparative evidence on the ethnicity of successful job appli-
cants in the U.S. and U.K. in the late l970s displayed in Table 1. The
figures in this table are taken fran t rohly comparable U.S. and U.K.
studies in which finns were mailed Ixigus applications of persons with equi-
valent credentials but differing ethnicity, and the treatment of the appli-
cations compared. While there are some differences between the studies
(the U.S. study sent blind letters to firms fran master lists of the Office
of Federal Contract Canpliance (OFCc); whereas the U.K. study sent letters
in response to job advertisements in the press), the basic procedures were
the same.2' As is readily apparent in the table the results are not. The
U.S. study found no evidence of discrimination against the "bogus" black
job applications, and indeed the ensuing debate in the journal focused on
the possibility of reverse discrimination;3" in the U.K. study, by contrast,
there is remarkable differentiation in the success of applications arrong
ethnic groups. While we lack a cxxnparable U. S. study for an earlier period
of time, or for companies wbo are not federal contractors and thus not required
to take "affirmative action" in favor of minorities and nen wDrkers in
addition to being subject to antibias anploent laws, it is highly unlikely—2—
TABLE 1
Percentage of Bogus JcbApplications
That are SuccessfulU.S. vs. U.K.
responses blind to letters to
advertiserrent iiployers
U.K. U.S.
Nationality 1977—78 Ethnic 1977
Great Britain 85 Black 30





Source: U.K.; Firth, Michael. Racial Discrimination in the British
LahrMarket,"Industrial and LalorRelationsReview Vol. 34,
No.2 (January 1981):265—72; Table 1, p.268.
U.S.;Newman, JerryM."Discrimination inRecruitment: An
Empirical Analysis," Industrial and LabDr Relations Review
Vol. 32, No. 1(October 1978): 15—23; Table 1,p. 20.—3—
that the U. S. finns showed the same color—blindness in treatment of
applicants thirty or forty years agoandmay irxJeed have looked more
like their British peers.
To what extent is the absence of ployer discrimination arrong
U.S. firms with federal contracts, at least at the level of responding
to applicant letters, mirrored in aggregate statistics on incomes/occupational
attainment by ethnic group? How great has been the improvement in the
economic position of blacks, the major discriminated—against minority
in the U.S.? To what extent can the evidence of nondiscrimination in Table 1
and changing patterns of aggregate labor market position be attributed
to U.S. public policy? In light of the wide array of laws and policies
in the U.S., what if anything can be said about the effectiveness of spe-
cific public policy tools?
Aggregate labor market performance
Table 2 presents a capsule sumary of the change in the earnings,
incxtne, and occupational position of black workers over the entire post-
war period, with the years 1964 (when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which made illegal emplonent discrimination, was passed in Congress);
1969, a "peak" economic year, and the most recent year for which I could
obtain data included. The final column of the table records changes in the
relevant ratios from 1964 (or closest year) to the most recent year.
The table tells a clear story. Virtually every indicator of positions
shows a marked improvement in the economic -status of employed black workers,
with --ashas been widely noted by various analysts --gainscoicentrated
axtong women, highly educated or skilled men, and young men. Virtually every
indicator of positions al shows a marked acceleration in the economic status
of eiloyed black workers after 1964, when the U.S. antibias effort intensified
as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of that year. Despite the-4-
TABLE
Evidence on Black Earnings or
IncomePrress in the 1970s
Change
Males 1949 1964 1969 1979 1964—79
1. Median Wages
and Salaries
All workers ..50 .59 .67 .13
Year—round and
full—time workers .64 .66 .69 .76 .10
(1955)
2. Median or
usual weekly earnings .69 .71 .78 .09
(1967)
3.?dian Incort, by
Age, JUl W3rkers (1949)
andyear-round full-time Change
sorkers (other years)1949 1959 1969 1979 1959—79
20—24 .66 .64 .82 .80 .16
25—34 .60 .61 .72 .80 .19
35—44 .55 .59 .68 .85 .26
45—54 .54 .55 .68 .67 .12
4. MedianInn
orMeanEarnings,
by Years of Change
Eduction 1949 1959 1969 1979 1959—79
High sclx)o1graduates .68 .69 .68 .73 .04
College graduates
fouryearsor irorea .60 .60 .63 .76 .16
5. Ratio of Percen-
tage of all nonwhites
ciaployedin occu-
pations to percentage
of.t11 whiles in occu— Change
ptions 1950 1964 1969 1979 1964—79
Professionals .39 .45 .48 .54
anaers .22 .22 .28 .37 .15
Craftsien .41 .58 .68 .81 .23
Mingers, college









8. Ratio of per-
centage of all non-
whites in occupations












1950 1964 1969 1979
.47 .60 .70 .75




4, 6: U.S. Bureau ofthe Census,
taketheratio of black and other
3& 4,the same in 1969 and1979.
as listeI below.
race's earningsto






1949: Census of Population 1950; Special Reports:
1959:Census of Population 1960; Subject Reports:
Table 6.
1964: Current Population Reports, Consumer Irome Series P—60, No. 47,
Table 33.
1969:P—60, No. 75, Tables45 & 59
1979: Series P—60, No. 129, Tables
Lines 2 & 7: Monthly Lalx)r Review,
1978.
Lines 5 & 8: U.S. Bureau of LaIr Statistics, Educational Attainment
of WDrkers, Special Lalor Ftrce Reports No. 240, Table K, p. A-21
No.125, Table J,p. A—29; No. 53, TableJ,p. A-14.
1950ttployrnentfrcn Census ofPopulation1950,EducationP-E
No.5B, Table 11, pp. 88-94 (figures for 15 and over).

















(lines 1,3,6) and Table 47.
51& 62.
variousissues. 1979 figure is for—6—
poor perfornaixe of the ecorxzmj of the 1970s, there is no evidence of a
dline in the relative black positions in that period. The continued
positive trend in the face of cyclic forces operating againstblacks5'
suggests that the earnings and occupational progress of the post-1964
era are persistent rather than transitory develoçrnts. Detailed ana-
lyses of the changing patterns of progress of individuals and cxtorts
confirm this cx)nc1usion.6'
The time pattern of the upswing in the laor market position of
black Iinericans is analyzed in greater detail in Table 3, which examines
whether or not there is, other factors held fixed, a time series relation
between the post-1964 improvrent in the relative ecornic position of
blacks and the upswing of aritibias activity in the period. The dependent
variables, measured in logaritlinic form, are: the median wage and salary
earnings of nonwhite vrkers relative to white ..orkers fran 1947 to 1975;
the median wage and salary earnings of nonwhite s.orkers enployed full-tine
year-round to the earnings of comparable white s'orkers fran 1955 to 1975;
the ratio of the fixed weight index of the occupational position of nonwhite
orkers to the index for white 'xrkers fran 1958 to 1975.
The explanatory variables are:
TREND, a time trend which takes the va1i. 1 in the first year of
the regression and increases by on unit in each succeeding year. This
variable is designed to control for overall trends in the relative earnings
of nonwhites.
CYCLE, a business cycle indicator which is obtained as the deviation
of the log of real gross national product fran its trend level.
EFI), real cumulated expenditures by the equal lont opportunity
agency per nonwhite vorker, measured in log units, with the value1 used
for the period prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and as cumulated
real spending per nonwhite plus 1 in later periods. This variable is—7—
essentially a rost—1964 trend variable, which has the value 0 until 1965,
when the Act became effective and which trends upward thereafter. It is
to be viewed as an indicator of the shift in diand for the period and
rot as a measure of the effectiveness of the EEXJC or of any specific
overiitntal activity. If in the future the pattern of demand changed
due, say, to court rulings reducing the efficacy of the affirmative action
effort, a rtore canpiex variable would be required.
RED, the ratio of the median years of schooling of nonwhite workers
to the median years of schooling of white workers, entered to control for
the increased educational attainment of rowhite relative to white workers.
Because this variable has a very strong trend, however, its effect cannot
be readily distinguished fran the trend. It is entered only in a limited
nunber of equations.
In all cases the EEO variable obtains a statistically significant
sizeable sign. A sisple ost-l964 time trend would, it is imixrtant to
note, do abeut as well. The calculations do not "prove" any pelicy effect
bit they do show a change in pattern in the period of time unexplained
by other factors.
The data in Tables 2 and 3 should not be taken as measures of
extant discrimination in the U.S. laber market, as they do not control
for various earnings-related characteristics which may differ between
ethnic groups. If one performs a multiple regression of the (logarithm)
of earnings on various characteristics one obtains a crude indicator of
overall differences in pay due to race, other factors held fixed (I use
the word crude because of the lack of very fine measures of characteristics
in standard data sets). Such calculations for 1978 show relatively nodest
difference in the pay of blacks and whites with beth men and vrn included
in the data set, even with very limited controls (see Table 4).—8—
TPBLLE 3
Begression Coefficients and Starx3ard Errors for the Effect ofVariables
onthe Log of the Patio of Nonwhite to White arnings and
Occupational Position, 1948—l975
Measure of Palative d 2 Ecxnamic Position ConstantTIME cya"EEO RED Rflvlp RPART/R -d.w.
Male Workers
1. Median Wages& —.55 —.001 .42 .08 .832.32
Salaries, 1948—1975 (.002) (.23) (.01)
2. MedianWages& —.49 .003—.40 .03 .87 -2.19
Salaries of Year— (.002) (.17) (.01)
Pound& Full-Time
Workers, 1955—1975
3. Occupation —.33 .003 .10 .02 .08 .992.31
Index, 1958—1975 (.002) (.05) (.004) (.14)
Female Workers
1. Median Wages & —.96 .022 .34 .13 .971.85
Salaries, 1948—1975 (.002) (.32) (.02)
2. Median Wages & —.70 .019—.48 .05 .961.30
Salaries of Year— (.004) (.27) (.02)
Pound& Full-Time
Workers, 1955—1975
3. Occupation —.97 —.001 .12 .07 .66 .99+ 2.03
Index,1958—1975 (.005) (.10) (.01)(.25)
a/Ocdentvariables are the log of the relative economic status of nonwhites to whites.
obtained asresidual fromregression: G1P =6.14+.03 5T; R2 = .99where GNP =log
(.001)
ofGIP in 1972 dollars.
Source:R. Freemnan in Sherwin Posen, ed., StudiesinLabor Markets (University of Chicago
Press:1981).—9--
ThBLE4
ct of Being Nonwhite on the Log of
Average Hourly Earnings for Employed Private Sector Non-Agricultural








(age— scteoling —6) .038 69.22
Experience squared —.00064 54.73
R2 .351
n =35,816
Source:Tabulated fran May Current Population Survey Tapes—10—
At the sanetimethat there has been a marked novanent tcrd equality
ofearningsbetween employed blacks and whites, however, there has been a dis-
tressing deterioration in the likelihood of blacks holding jobs, particularly
airong the young. In 1964 the black male civilian 1oyrrent/popu1ation ratio stood
at .73;in 1969, it was.73; in 1979 it was .64. By contrast, for white males, the
ratiowent fran .78 (1964) to .78 (1969) to .75 (1979). Equallystriking,the youth
joblessness problem of the decade wasoneof increasing relative worseninginthe
black youth position, for reasonsthat noone hasyetsatisfactorily explained.
Theaggregate data thus tell two stories: improvrent for the employed but a re-
duction in the overall errployrnent rate, especially in the 1970s.
Thus far, we have presented evidence on employer behavior and
aggregative labor market performance. What about perceptions of discrimi-
nation (or reverse discrimination) by labor market participants? If, in
fact, labor market discrimination has becone less of a problem in
the U.S. in recent years, one might expect to find only a moderate proportion
of blacks reporting discrimination and to find that proportion declining
over time.
Table 5 surnnarizes evidence on perceived discrimination fran a
variety of surveys. While there are differences among the sur-
veys, there does appear to be a thwnward trend among blacks in reported
discrimination (17% (1969—70) to 14% (1977) in the Michigan PSID: 5.9%
(1971) to 5.0% (1976) in the National Longitudinal Survey) with at most
15% of blacks reporting racial discrimination at work by the late 1970s.
Again, we lack historical comparative data, but I think it is reasonable
to believe that three or four decades ago one would have obtained much
higher rates of reported discrimination.
In sum, the various pieces of evidence suggest a substantial
reduction in labor market discrimination by race in the U.S. and rather
striking differences vis-a-vis the U.K. While discriminatory differences
may not have disappeared, they have becane of sufficiently reduced
magnitude as to lead one irrportant analyst (William Wilson) to make "the
8/ declininci sicmificance of race" the title of his recent book.—11—
TABLE 5
Wageand Salary rkers Who
Rcprt Racial Discrimination
at t)rk on National Surveys
% IeJx)rtnq
Survey Race Discrimination







Men, 1971 5.9 0.9
1976 5.0 1.4
Wcznen, 1972 6.0 0.9
Young Wcaien, 1972 8.3 0.8
Youngn, 1971 11.4 1.4
Source: Tabulated from the relevant surveys.—12—
}1e of Public Policy
'lbwhat extentcan the changes in the economic position of black
Airricans and the apparent absence of np1oyer discrimination in sortie
aspects of market behavior be attributed to public policy designed to
eliminate overt market discrimination?
This is a highly controversial question, as it raises ixrortant
political arid ethical issues in a society dedicated to equality of oppor-
tunity but not of outcomes. Some (Freeman, Brown, Lnard, Burstein)
have concluded that public policy in the form of anti-discriminatory
regulations have had an impact on the economic position of minorities;
others (Butler &Heckman)have expressed rrore skeptical views.
Figure 1 provides a capsule picture of the major regulations and
laws in question. In terms of actual pressures on companies to engage in
nondiscriminatory rtp1oyment practices, the main thrust of the law is in the
form of "affirmative action" requirements under E.O. 11246 and of court
suits and consequent judicial decisions with respect to charges of discrimi-
natory acts. r"bst large companies in the U.S. have sufficient dealings with
the federal government to be liable to affirmative action regulations.
Indeed, the companies in the Newman study were, as rDted, taken from the master
list of the OFCC. As a result of affirmative action and antibias laws the
personnel practices of U.S. companies are quite sensitive to issues of
equal treatment of workers by race (see Table 6). Indeed, one of the
major complaints about the affirmative action requirements placed on federal
contractors is the expense it places on companies. While it is difficult to
measure the "full cost" of the affirmative action to the company, estimates
of the direct administrative cost by accounting firms for the Business—13—
FIGJRE1
Act What It Does
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Prohibits discrimination on the basis
Title VII of race, cxlor, national origin, sex
or religion. Enforced by Eqia1 flloy-
ment Oprtunity Camtission (EEOC).
Procedural mechanism is change—oriented.
In 1975 EEOC spent $55 million and
handled 77,000cases.
Executive Order 11246 Prohibits discrimination by contractors
doing business with federal govenilnent.
Enforced by Office of Federal Contract
Compliancein Department ofLabor.
AffirmativeAction (AA) plans heart of
program. NW requires nployers to
analyze racial/sexual cctnrosition of
ork force, identify areas of under-
utilization and project goals and time
tables for correcting problens.
State and Local Statutes Many states have Fair fltployment Practice
lawsmuchliice Title VII and agencies
to a±dnister the laws. The EEO defers
to State agencies. In 1975 about
$34million wasspent by the agencies or
about60% as much as by the EEX)C.—14—
Table 6: Evidence of Changes in Personnel Practices Due to
Equal Elonent Oprtunity
Zof companies
i. Have Formal EEO Program 86
Including Affirmative Action Plan 96
(of those subject to OFCCP regulations)
2. Have had investigation or other action under Title VII 63
3. Changes in selection procedures for EEOC reasons: 60
testing procedures 39
revised job qualifications 31
application forms 20
re.ruiting techniques 19
4. Special recruiting programs
for all minority workers 69
for minorities in professional/managerial positions 58
5. Programs to insure EEC policies are implemented
comsTlunications on EEC policy 95
follow—up personnel or EEC office 85
training sessions on EEO . 67
periodic publications of EEO results 48
EEO achievements included in performance appraisals 33
6. Special training jrograms
For entry—level jobs
For upgrading 24
For management positions 16
Source: Bureau of National Affairs Personnel Policies Forum
Equal Emolovment Ooportunitv: Prorams & Results
PPFSurvey No. 112, 1arcti 1976
line1,2 table 9, p. 15
line 3, table 3, p. 4
line 4, table 1, p. 2
line 5, table 6, p. 9
line 6, table 5, p. 8—15—
Poundtable suggests magnitudes on the order of $78 per anployee per year, or
roughly 1% of profits.9/As any observer of American corporations can attest,
there is a significant effort being made by irost canpanies to cDrnply with (or,
nore cynically, to appear to comply with) affirmative action r&uirements.
In the l½marican legalistic society exurt decisions necessarily play
a major role in the actual impact of ED) legislation. Between 1964 and 1981
Irore than 5000 suits dealing with discrimination under title VII were decided
in the Federal District Courts 10/ Nearly a third of these were class action
suits, in which statistical evidence pertaining to disparities have cane to
play a significant role in deciding guilt or innocence.
A class action discrimination suit has a major impact on canpany
behavior. In cases with which I am familiar oDrnpanies invariably slow
an improvement in their treatment of minorities after the first major
suit of this nature. The suit reguires than to examine longstanding
personnel practices which, possibly inadvertently, have limited the an-
ployment prospects of minorities within firms. It is also noterthy
that companies invariably seek to limit statistical analyses to their
performance after July 1, 1965 (when the 1964 Civil Rights Act took effect),
since the data invariably slxws marked improvements after the effective date
of the law.' Before July, 1965, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and
so forth was legal under federal law, tIough not under some state laws.
In the late 1960s court decisions regarding discrimination seemed
relatively favorable to plaintiffs. As the nost egregious forms of dis-
criznination have disappeared, 1-owever, the likelilood of plaintiffs winning
discrimination suits has fallen. Table 7 documents this claim for dis-
cri.mination suits in 5 circuit courts from 1966-69 to 1980, using data
fran Richard Lung's analysis of 314 cases in the courts from 1966 to 1980.
The table sl'xws a striking increase in the proportion of judgemnents for
the defense, from 14% in the former period to 51% in the latter, tiough no—16—
Table 7: Percentage Distribution of Court Discrimination




Result (Metric for computing average score)
Relief toPlaintiff (100) 27 26
Motionto dismiss denied (75) 47 11
Intermediate judgnt (50) 9 6
Mjtionto dismiss partially granted (37. 5) 9 6
Judganent for defense, case dismissed (0) 14 51
AverageScore 65.6 39.5
Source:Richard E. Lung
"A statistical na1ysis of Title VII, Employment Discrimination
Court Cases,"thesis, HarvardUniversity, pri1, 1982.
See P. 7forcoding used byLung;pp. 15-20 for data.—17—
decrease in the fraction of cases in which plaintiffs vn relief. Scoring
the outecines on a range fran 0 to 100, with 0 least favorable to the
plaintiff ard 100 rrost favorable, the average discrimination suit in the 5
rrajor circuit courts scored65.6in 1967—69 compared to 35.9 in 1980.
In a statistical regression, with numerous controls for the type of suits,
Lung obtained a significant downward trend in the extent of plaintiff's
victory comparable to the change in nean figures cited above. Over the
period covered, there was a one-half standard deviation shift in the
outcones, against plaintiffs11"whichLung attributed to the striking
change in the nature of suits being brought, fran those involving blatant
discrimination to uore subtle forms. As an example of an early court
of appeals case, Lung cites Gihin vs. Federal Paper Board, 479F 2d 100
where the judgent noted
1Headvised Gillin when she expressed her interest
in the position that it was not suited to a women arid
was more suitable to a man. He indicated to the EEOC
investigator that he would have placed the job news-
paper advertisement in a column specifically directed
to males, had such been available. On trial while he
conceded that a women might handle the job under
special circumstances, he adhered to the view that the
traffic manager's position was a 'man's" post. He
stated that "(i)t would be an extreme case that a
woman could ever take on a truck fleet operation and
do it properly." He further testified:
Q. So you are satisfied that Miss Gillin's
femininity hurt her and also her qualifica-
tions weren't there, right?
A. Correct
Q. All right. And that had her qualifica-
tions has been there her femininity still
would have hurt her?
A. Yes, it might have.'—18—
One does not find such overt practices in the court cases of the 1980s.
Econanic Studies of the Effectiveness of Affirmative Action arid Court Activities
'I types of evidence have been offered with respect to the impact
of the legal anti-bias effort on the gains of blacks shown earlier: time
series data, focusing on the timing of the observed changes (see figure 1);
and time series/cross—section comparisons of the performance of sectors
of the economy/finns nre or less pressured by the law.
With respect to the time series, while alternative possibilities
have been suggested to explain the post-1964 upiard trend in the position
of blacks, the impact of antibias laws and regulations rnains the nost
plausible explanation. Efforts to relate the trend to changes in attitudes
Burstein ),inblack labor force participation (Butler & Heckrnan)
have not eliminated the post—1964 shift shocin in Figure 2 (see Brown,
Freeman). This does not, of course, imply tthat the time series provides
strong evidence that public policy was effective, only that it is con-
sistent with such an explanation.
A cornp1entary potentially rrore insightful irode of examining the
impact .of public policy is to contrast the performance of companies/sectors
of the economy with/without affirmative action regulations or government
compliance pressures and t1/wit1ut significant court suits. Several
studies were conducted in the early 1970s examining the apparent impact of
the affirmative action contract compliance effort on company performance
(Burman, Ashenfelter-Heckman, Heckman-Wolpin, Coldstein—Smith). Three of—19--
the four studies found evidence that black employment increased nore rapidly
in cxnpanies facing severe federal pressure than in other cxxnpanies. One
did not find such effects. These studies, Ixwever, dealt with OFCC activity
at an early stage in its histc)ry, before major administrative changes &ere
made. Since the early studies absence of publicly available data has
precluded further wrk in the area until recently.
The impact of court decisions and suits on company performance,
while extremely iurtant in the eyes of tiose wI have withessed first-hand
the effect of suits on behavior, has also not received the statistical study
it merits until very recently.
Both gaps in our knowledge of the apparent role of public policy
on the observed changes in black lathr market position have been remedied
by a recent doctorate thesis at Harvard University (Jonathan Leonard, Ph.D.
dissertation, 1982). This dissertation provides what is perhaps our best
statistical answer to questions regarding the impact of the tw main thrusts
of the law —-courtsuits and affirmative action.
The Leonard Dissertation Results
Leonard's dissertation tests separately for the effect of court
suits and affirmative action pressures on growth of employment of minorities,
identifying the impact of policy effects on loyment by linking policy
in a period of time to growth in employment over time.
Table 8 surmarizes the results of Leonard's analysis of the effect
of class action suits per nonwhite srker on minority employment. Leonard's
"experiment" is to relate the 1978 proportion of wrkers in a state-2 digit
(Standard Industrial Classification) industry cell wro are black to the
1966-1978 cumulated number of equal emplont opportunity suits per firm in
that cell, to the proportion of blacks in the cell in 1966, and to various—20—
control variables. To perform this analysis he coded over 1,000 cases
by industry and state; his data set contains 555 observations. If court
cases have an impact on anplorent of mirxrity workers one would expect
a positive coefficient on the case variable, and this is what he finds.
Columns 1 and 2 of the table record the proportion of blacks in
1966 and 1978, while column 3 gives the change in proportion, which are
always positive, in part due to the rising black share of the U.S. popu—
lation. Note, however, the markedly larger percentage increase in the
proportion black in the white collar and professional-ma.ragerial occu-
pations than in the blue collar occupations.
The positive significant coefficients on the court case variable
in column 4 indicate that the growth of the black proportion of workers
was not random across cells, but rather was largest where there was 'tore
court activity. The regression coefficients in column 5 show that a one
standard deviation change in the number of suits per nonwhite worker
raised the black proportion of workers in a state-industry cell from
.09 to .25 standard deviations, depending on the specific proportion
under consideration. The greatest effects were found for the 'tore skilled
male occupations and for black feia1es in nearly all occupations.
From these calculations Lecnard concludes that EEO suits have an
impact on the lonent practices of American industry.
This does rot, of course, Itean that large numbers of black workers
have been involved in court suits. They have rot. What appears to be
the case is that companies "get their act together" in various areas of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Turning to the impact of affirmative action, Leonard has obtained
information on the black share of ployment in 18,000 establishments,
72% of kx)m are federal contractors reufr&1 to have affirmative action
plans and 28% of whcxu are rDncontracting establishments, for the period
1974-1980. In addition, he has information on the number of 'caipliance
reviews' (formal examination of the effort to comply with affirmative
action plans by federal compliance officials). Tu evaluate the impact
of affirmative action on establishment 'np1oyment of black orkers he
calculates the percentage changes in the black proportion of orkers in
contractor and ncncontractor establishments fran 1974 to 1980 and the
percentage changes in the black proportion of orkers in reviewed and
nonreviewed contractor establishments over the same period. If the
affirmative action effort was significant one wu1d expect greater in-
creases in the black share of loynent in contractor than in roncon-
tractor establishments and greater increases in the black share of loy-
ment in reviewed than in nonreviewed establishments.
Table 9 presents Leonard's preliminary findings for black .orkers
en toto and in professional and managerial occupations, and for black
male orkers en toto and in thse occupations. Panel A treats establish-
merits by contractor status while panel B treats contractor establishments
by review status.
The figures in panel A sIDw uniformly larger (and statistically
significant given the sample sizes) increases in the black share of vrkers
in contractor than in noncontractar establishments. The differentials
are troderate but noticeable for all employees but quite large in the pro-
fessional and managerial areas, which have attracted irLich affirmative
action pressure due to low "utilization" of minorities. The difference
in the annual rates of change given in the final column to the right suggest—24—
that the relative denand for black wrkers in cxntractor finns grew by
1-3% per year nore rapidlythanin rorxontractor firms (depending on the
particular group).
The data in panel B suggest that much of the "better" performance
of federal contractors is a result of ccanpliance reviews. In all of the
cases, contractors who were reviewed show greater percentageincreases
in the black propartion of anployees than do contractors who were not
reviewed. Unfortunately because of differences in the samples drawn,
however, it is not passible at this time to contrast the reviewed/not-
reviewed establishments with non-contractor establishments: as can be
seen in the table, the propartions in panels A and B are not consistent;
when Lnard canpietes a full analysis of all establishments, we will
have a better picture of behavior. As it stands, however, the panel
B data strongly suggest that contractor firms respand to pressures generated
by a review of their affirrrative action plans, with relative drand for
black labor rising by 1-5% per annum as a result of the reviews.
In addition to looking at the growth in the black share of employ-
ment Lnard has also compared the black share of new hires and prarotions
with the share of np1oyment, on the hypathesis that hires and prorrotions
represent the firms' margin of adjustaent. In 1978 his data showthat
whereas (in companies facing compliance reviews) 1.6% of professionals
were black men, 3.2% of new hires into professional jobs were black,and
2½% of pronotions airong professionals were given to black men --arate
56% above their share of the stock of wrkers. Similar patterns are
observed for other white collar occupations 1it not necessarily for blue
collar jobs where blacks are relatively well represented.12/—25—
TABLE 9
The Changing Percentage of Workers Who Are Black in Establishments,
byAffirmativeAction Status and Pressure, 1974-1980
A. By Contractor Statusa
Federal Difference in
Occupation/Demographic Contractor NoncontractorCompound Annual
Group 19741980 19741980 % Growth
1. All Occupations
Both sexes .088.107 22 .092 .107 16 0.8
Male Employeesb .083.098 18 .091.104 14 0.7
2. Professionals
Both sexes .020.035 75 .022 .034 55 2.0
Male Employeesb .017.025 47 .018 .022 22 3.2
3. Managers
Both sexes .025.043 72 .032 .048 50 2.3
Male Employeesb .024.038 58 .026 .039 50 0.9
B. Compliance Review in 1978C
4.AllOccupations
Both sexes .106.129 22 .084 .097 15 1.0
Male Empioyeesb .095.112 18 .081.090 11 1.0
5. Professionals
Both sexes .015 .032 113 .020 .053 65 4.0
Male Employeesb .013.024 85 .017 .024 41 4.6
6. Managers
Both sexes .022.043 95 .019 .031 63 3.0
Male Employeesb .022.039 77 .018 .028 56 2.1—26--
TABLE 8 (cont.)
Source: Tabulated from Office of Federal Contract Compliance computer tapes by
Jonathan Leonard.
a) Sample size: 12918 federal contractor establishments
5082 non-contractor establishments
b) Figures report percentage of men who are black.
c) Sample size: 272 reviewed establishments
2073 never—reviewed establishments—27—
In sIort, the Lnard dissertation results suggest that b3th
court suits under Title VII and affirmative action under Executive Order
1124 6 contribute to 1oynnt of minorities.
From micro 1oyment studies to macro earnings patterns
The reader will notice that Lecnard' s (and earlier studies) of
the effect of policy on black ecoromic progress analyze Er1oyment whereas
the aggregative data slow ixnprovenents in earnings and occupational status.
One way of relating the twD pieces of evidence is to treat the micro
changes in np1oynnt as representing the effect of shifts in drand, which
given relatively fixed supplies of black labor, cause increase in black
wages. From this perspective the key link between the micro-analysis
and the macro earnings patterns is found in the elasticity of danand for
black labor: the less elastic is the drand curve, the greater will be
the irract of any shift in dnd on the relative wages of black orkers.
As a first approximation, let us develop a simple ts sector
itodel to analyze the potential impact of the observed 1-2% annual increase
in the black share of nplont in companies with affirmative action plans.
This irodel, contained in Appendix A, relates the growth of the wages of
black rkers relative to white rkers to the growth of eniployment in
the contractor sector on the asstniiption that the sector must increase
wages to attract additional workers. On the assumption that the relative
supply of black and white orkers does not change, the rrodel yielded the
following equation for the relative wages of black sorkers:
Percentage Change Percentage Growth in Dand for
in Relative Wages= BlackWDrkers Relative to White +
ofBlack Wzrkers WDrkers in Noncontractor Sector
(Contractor Share, Elasticity of Driand for Differential Growth of
of flloyment/BlackRelative to White Workers flrployment for Black
Relative to White WDrkers
in the Contractor Sector
Versus the Noncontractor
Sector—28—
Accxrding to this uation the observed growth of relative loent in
the contractor sector of 1-3% per annum will raise the wage of blacks by
the ratio of the contractor share of loymant to the elasticity of demand
for black as opExsed to white vrkers. Assuiing for simplicity that dnarid
elasticity is unity and that the contractor share is .60,we see that every
1% increase in relative 1oynEnt in the contractor sector will raise dnand
by .6%. Over the six years covered, a 1-3% annual increase in relative enploy-
rnent due to affirmative action pessures vuld translate into a 4-11%
increase in the ratio of black to white wages—a magnitude consistent with
affirmative action paying a major role in improving the ratio of black
to white earnings in the econany. As Lecnardt s estimates of the growth
of the black share of aiçloyrrent in companies facing affirmative action pressure
are ccrarable to tbose found in three of four earlier studies (Ashenfelter-
Hec3mn; Heckman-WD].pin; Burroan; the exception being Goldstein and Smith)
it seens reasonable to conclude that the micro-establishnnt work is
consistent with an explanation of black economic progress that puts great
weight on public policy.
Conclusion
This paper began with a comparison of the r1oymant practices
of Arrerican and British firms with respect to ethnic/national groups.
It found Anerican firms to be roughly color-blind; it then vnt on to
docurrent what is by now the widely accepted finding regarding the dimi-
nished significance of race in the U.S. labor market. With respect to
the highly controversial issue of the irtpact of public policy, the paper
surrrnarized the newest research in the area, which finds a sizeable role
for court suits and for affirmative action canpliance activity. While
U.S. public policy in the area of equal rploynent has its faults, par-
ticularly with respect to administrative paper work, it has apparently
done what it was noant to do: substantially rtove enployer discrisni-
natory barriers to minority xrmic progress.—29—
Ecotrotes
1/ The compensating differential theory of market discrimination
was first developed by G. Becker. For further theoretical rk see K. Arrow,
R. Freeman.
2/ The Firth study sent seven letters to 282 employers advertising
in the press for accountants arid financial executives. The Newman study
sent t letters to 207 companies on the OFCClist.The difference in
the acceptance rates represents the difference between letters sent to
eloyers with a definite vacancy and those wittout.
3/ See Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Conmunications, Vol. 33,
No. 4, July 1980, pp. 543—9.
4/ Recall that prior to July, 1965 companies could indeed discriminate
blatantly without breaking federal law.
5/ That black earnings and occupational pesition tend to be pro-
cycles has been found in numerous studies. See, for example, R. Freeman,
"The Changing Lalx)r Market for Black Zrnericans, 1948-1973" (Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Surmer 1973).
6/ See R. Freeman, "Have Black Labor Market Gains Post-1964 Been
Permanent or Transitory?" National Bureau of Economic Research, rking
Paper No.751, September, 1981.
7/ The employnent/papulation rates for black youths aged 18-19 fell
fran 52in 1964 to 37 in1977 while the ratioforite outhsactually
rose fran 58to 65 over the sameperiod. (SeeR. FreemanaidB. Wise,
TheYouth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes and Consauences,
Universityof Chicago Pres, 1982).
8/ William Wilson, The DecliningSignificanceof Race (University
of Chicago,1978).—30—
Footnotes(cont.)
9/arthurAnderson, "Business Roundtable Study of Costs of Regulation."
10/ Thisfigure was tatxilated from the LEXIS comp.iter file of court
cases. District courts handle only a selected set of cases. While their
case load is not random, there is no rson to expect it to bias our
results, as the nonrandom corronent has nothing to do with our analysis.
11/See Richard Lung, "A Statistical ?na1ysis of Title VII Err1oyrtent
Discrimination Court Ca"
12/See L&nard, Table 3-1 from seminar at Harvard University lalor
xjrks1xp, April 1982.—31—
Appendix A: Formal Model Relating the
Shift in the Black Share of
Enp1oyment to Macro Changes in Wages
Let: =percentagechange in the black share of nplonent in the
(x)ntractor sector of the ecoricxriy
=percentagechange in the black share of euployment in the
noncontractor sector
=percentagegrowth in deuand for black share of workers in
noncontractor sector of the economy
n=elasticityof deuand for black share of workers, assumed
the sane in both sectors
W =percentagechange in wages of black workers relative to
other workers, assumed the sane in both sectors.
Then, the change in deuand for black workers in the econany as
a wbole is:
(1) +(1—a) = — rW) +(1—a)(X2 —W) -.
= X2+ - X2)-
wherecx ="share"of eutploynent in contractor sector.
Setting the change in demand equal to the assumed zero change in
supply yields the following equation for wage changes:
(2)
+a(Xx2)
But,given the sane elasticity of dnarx in the two sectors, the relative
etiployment will grow nore in the contractor sector according to the equation
(3) E1-E =xl-x2
i.e. only if the shift in derand is greater in the contractor sector.
Substituting (3) into (2) yields:
•x2+E1-E2) (4) W = , theequation given in the text.—32—
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